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Does Director Trading Change the Information Environment? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Investigating ASX300 firms for the period 2002-2010, we find that the information content of 
director trading has a negative relationship with post-trade information asymmetry, but a 
positive relationship with information efficiency. These results are mainly driven by director 
purchases rather than their sales, and are stronger in non-executive director trading. Our 
results are robust to the adoption of IFRS in 2005 and the global financial crisis in 2008. 
These findings back the claims of insider trading proponents, by showing that director trading 
plays a crucial role in reducing information asymmetry and in improving information 
efficiency for stock market participants. 
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1. Introduction 
We investigate the effect of trading by directors in their own firm’s shares (known as 
corporate insider trading) on two aspects of the firm’s information environment: information 
asymmetry and stock price informational efficiency. While these legal trades can be 
conducted for liquidity and diversification reasons, some trades are based on insiders’ 
informational advantage (Seyhun, 1992; Brown, Foo and Watson, 2003). The relationship 
between insider trading and market efficiency is an important consideration in the enactment 
and enforcement of regulation on insider trading globally. The abnormal returns following 
these trades raise residual concerns that the existing regulation that allows insiders to trade in 
their own firm’s shares under certain conditions but requires them to disclose their trading in 
a timely manner may not be entirely effective.1 
The pioneering work of economists such as Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) is based on the notion that trading by informed traders or insiders is the primary 
channel by which information is incorporated into price. Advocates for insider trading argue 
that these insiders possess superior information compared to outsiders. Insider trading 
therefore enhances the information environment by improving stock price informativeness 
which in turn results in better resource allocation and improved decision making. For 
example, Manne (1966), Carlton and Fischel (1983), and Leland (1992) argue that insider 
trading speeds up the flow of insiders’ private information into stock prices, thereby 
enhancing the information environment by improving stock price informativeness. 
Empirically, Seyhun (1988), Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003) and Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2005) show that trading by insiders incorporates new, private and firm specific information 
into price. However, Fishman and Hagerty (1992) among others, challenge this view, 
                                                          
1 S1002G(1) of the Corporations Act provides the definition of insider and inside information is defined in 
s1042A. S1043A prohibits insiders acquiring, or disposing of, financial products based on inside information. 
s205G (4) requires directors to disclose trades in their company’s securities within 14 days of the transaction. 
The ASX Listing Rules 3.19A.1 and 3.19A.2 stipulate that changes of directors’ interests must be disclosed 
within five working days. 
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contending that insider trading impairs price informativeness and deteriorates stock price 
efficiency. This is because other traders, aware of the presence of insiders in the market, are 
discouraged from collecting and trading on information or they may exit the market 
altogether. Specifically, Bushman, Piotroki and Smith (2005) find that insider trading crowds 
out private information acquisition by outsiders. Investigating analyst following in countries 
that impose restrictions on insider trading activities, they however find that the crowding-out 
effect is concentrated in emerging markets. Similarly, Ausubel (1990) shows that regulation 
enhances market confidence and wider participation by investors who can now trade on a 
level playing field. However, Durnev and Nain (2007) report that while stricter regulation 
deters private information trading, it is less effective in firms with high agency costs. These 
contradicting points of view highlight the tension between boosting market efficiency (where 
private information is reflected in stock price) and maintaining market confidence and 
integrity (to reduce exploitation of investors by better informed parties). 
We direct our focus to the interplay between insider trading and the firm’s 
information environment, which includes two important dimensions namely, information 
asymmetry and stock price informativeness. Information asymmetry occurs when there are 
informational differences across investors in a market. According to microstructure theory, it 
exists when informed traders are present in the market. To protect themselves from potential 
losses when trading with more informed traders, liquidity traders demand wider bid-ask 
spreads (Kyle, 1985, Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Corporate insiders represent one such 
group of potentially informed traders with access to private information. Regulation however 
prohibits them from trading on price sensitive information although, when they do trade, they 
are required to disclose their trades to the market in a timely manner. According to Huddart, 
Hughes and Levine (2001), public disclosure of insider trades hastens price discovery while 
reducing trading profits. Another dimension of the information environment is information 
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efficiency. Information efficiency differs from information asymmetry because it depends on 
the precision of private information held by corporate insiders. Price informativeness can be 
useful for corporate decisions. For example, Ferreira et al. (2011) report substitution of board 
monitoring with price informativeness, because more informative prices make boards more 
effective and reduce the need for board independence. 
In this study, we apply two measures from contemporary microstructure literature, the 
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread (adverse selection cost) and the probability 
of information-based trading (PIN). Similar approaches were taken by Straser (2002), Aslan 
(2002) and Sidhu, Smith, Whaley and Willis (2008) in their examination of the effects of 
Regulation FD on information asymmetry. These measures have also been selected because 
their relationship with insider trading has not been previously examined within the Australian 
market where such an examination is necessary. Essentially, they reflect the benefits (more 
efficient prices) and costs (cost of adverse selection) on the information environment.  
We use the PIN measure developed by Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) 
which provides a direct measure of informed trading by analysing information in the trade 
flow. Many empirical studies examine the role of price informativeness on corporate 
decisions, using PIN as the proxy for informativeness. For example, Ferreira et al. (2011) find 
that more informative prices make boards more effective and reduce the need for board 
independence. Kang and Liu (2010) show that risk-driven information-based trading leads to 
improved CEO incentives. Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) report that price 
informativeness affects firm investment policy. The adverse selection cost measure, on the 
other hand, reflects the cost of trading with informed investors. Where market makers are 
present, adverse selection cost is designed to capture the cost of compensating the market 
makers when they trade with informed investors (Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 2009).  
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We find that director trades reduce information asymmetry (adverse selection cost) 
and increase information efficiency (price informativeness). Further analysis reveals that the 
results can be predominantly attributed to director purchases instead of their sales. In addition, 
we find that non-executive (independent) director trading, rather than trading by executives, 
improves the information efficiency of the stock trading environment. Finally, we examine 
the marginal impact of two significant market events, the adoption of IFRS in 2005 and the 
global financial crisis in 2008, on the association between the information content of director 
trading and the stock trading environment. We find no impact arising from these two events, 
suggesting that our findings are robust under different market conditions. Therefore, we 
present a contemporary investigation of the effect of insider trading on two microstructure 
measures, reflecting information asymmetry and efficiency in the firm’s information 
environment. Further decomposition of the insider trades suggests that insider purchases are 
more likely to be driven by information than insider sales, since the latter can be motivated 
by liquidity and portfolio diversification. In addition, non-executives’ trades contain more 
information than executive trades, possibly because the latter are under stricter monitoring 
and scrutiny. We triangulate the insider trades and measures of information asymmetry with 
abnormal returns following these trades. This is because the returns to trades signal the 
private information associated with them, where higher returns are indicative of more 
informed trades. To the best of our knowledge, our findings have not been documented in the 
Australian market and our study contributes to the existing literature due to interesting 
differences between the Australian and U.S. markets. 
We contend that the Australian market is an ideal setting to examine the relation 
between director trading and the stock market information environment for the following 
reasons. First, the information environment in Australia is managed by the Continuous 
7 
 
Disclosure Regime2, which was introduced in 1994. It aims to reduce information asymmetry 
between management and investors and also between different types of investors. This is 
achieved through effective and timely disclosure where firms are expected to inform 
investors (via the Australian Securities Exchange, ASX) of any market sensitive information 
when it becomes aware of such information. Brown, Taylor and Walter (1999) report 
increases in disclosures with the introduction of the Continuous Disclosure Regime, although 
such changes were limited to small and poorly performing firms. In contrast, when they 
examined increased enforcement under the same regime, Hsu, Lindsay and Tuttici (2012) 
find deterioration in analyst forecast dispersion in small firms, likely due to the ban on 
selective disclosure to financial analysts. Such continuous and periodic reporting frequency 
affects the firm’s information environment where for example, compared to US firms, the 
majority of Australian firms report earnings on a half-yearly basis. 
Second, although insider trading regulation is now commonplace in both developed 
and emerging markets with Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) reporting insider trading laws in 
87 out of the 103 countries in their study, Australia continues to stand out among common 
law countries with restrictive insider trading regulation (Beny, 2005). There have also been 
improvements in enforcement with increases in prosecutions for insider trading in recent time. 
Such strong regulation and effective enforcement are predicted to alter both the information 
environment and the trading behaviour of insiders as shown in Brochet (2010) after the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in the U.S. and Frijns, Gilbert and Tourani-Rad (2008) after the 
Securities Market Amendment Act (SMAA) in New Zealand. 
Last, a persistent finding exists in Australian director trading studies where director 
sales are reported to have more information content about future firm performance compared 
to purchases (see for example, Brown, Foo and Watson, 2003). This is in contrast to the more 
                                                          
2 The Continuous Disclosure Regime is regulated in Chapter 6CA (s674-678) of the Corporations Act and 
through the ASX Listing Rules (Chapter 3). 
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prevalent finding that purchases have comparatively more information content (Lakonishok 
and Lee, 2001; Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog, 2006). In Hong Kong however, abnormal 
returns are earned on both insider purchases and sales (Cheuk, Fan and So, 2006) Fidrmuc, 
Korczak and Korczak (2013) also find that in countries with stronger governance and 
enforcement mechanisms, insider purchases are more informative. While there is general 
agreement that insider purchases signal the firm’s favourable future prospects, the 
information associated with sales is less clear. Insider sales can signal negative information 
about the firm’s prospects, but they can also be conducted for liquidity, rebalancing or 
diversification, which are less informative. With the contrasting information content between 
purchases and sales, it is interesting to investigate whether the insider purchases or sales in 
Australia have stronger effect on the information environment.  
The time period covered in our study traversed two significant market-wide events, 
the adoption of IFRS in 2005 and the global financial crisis in 2008, which had the potential 
to change the firm’s information environment. Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) and Barth, 
Landsman and Lang (2008) suggest that reporting under IFRS increases transparency 
resulting in higher quality financial reporting. There is also a counter-contention that IFRS 
would bring little change to accounting quality as Australian domestic standards were similar 
to IFRS and being a common law country, it has strong investor protection (Jeanjean and 
Stolowy, 2008). However, Brochet et al (2013) report that following IFRS adoption by UK 
firms, there was a reduction in private information benefits in the form of lower abnormal 
returns with insider purchases only. Another important event that could potentially influence 
the relationship between director trading profitability and stock information environment was 
the global financial crisis in 2008. Panic among investors during the crisis impaired market 
liquidity and increased the adverse selection effect of director trading (Brunnermeier & 
Pedersen, 2009). Directortrading can be more informative when the trading of other investors 
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becomes rare in the post-crisis period due to the lack of confidence. We therefore take a step 
further to look at whether these significant market events had any influence on the 
relationship between director trading and the stock information environment. Consistent with 
previous studies, we find that the adoption of IFRS in 2005 and the global financial crisis in 
2008 had significant impacts on the information environment, but neither event had a 
significant moderating effect on the association between the director trading and the stock 
information environment. Thus, our findings are robust under different market conditions.  
This study contributes the literature in several ways. First, our results highlight the 
effects of director trading on the information environment. In particular, trading by directors 
reduces information asymmetry and improves information efficiency for stock market 
participants. Second, we mark the importance of the types of director trades (purchase or sale) 
and the roles played by the directors (executives or non-executives) in assessing the effect on 
the information environment. We thereby provide additional information for regulators and 
monitors of the capital market, which helps improve the efficiency of insider trading 
regulation and disclosure requirements, leading to better investor protection. Finally, global 
events such as the introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the 
global financial crisis (GFC) did not impact on the relation between insider trade returns and 
the firm’s trading environment, suggesting it is robust to different time periods and market 
conditions. Our study urges a more comprehensive documentation of director trading activity 
so that we can better understand the impact and effect of these activities on many aspects of 
firm value and trading participation. 
The remainder of the study is as follows. Section 2 presents the review of the 
literature and hypothesis. Section 3 provides data, method and descriptive statistics. Section 4 
and Section 5 give the results and conclusions, respectively. 
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2. Prior work and hypotheses 
2.1 Prior work on the relation between insider trading and information environment 
Information-driven trading by corporate insiders is a double-edged sword; it can 
potentially both benefit and harm the firm’s information environment. Such informed trading 
affects information asymmetry because corporate insiders have access to information 
unavailable to outside investors. Insiders also have the opportunity to extract private benefits 
by trading on this information. With these trades, insiders’ private information is incorporated 
into the stock prices, and thereby insider trading can make stock price more informative. 
Proponents of insider trading such as Manne (1966) and Carlton and Fischel (1983) 
contend that insider trading is beneficial because it improves the firm’s information 
environment. They suggest that insiders are the most informed parties about their firm’s 
future prospects. As they trade, their private information is incorporated into stock prices in a 
more timely and accurate fashion, and thus their transactions improve the firm’s information 
efficiency. In contrast, others believe that insider trading exacerbates the information 
asymmetry faced by outside market participants, thereby discouraging investment (Ausubel, 
1990) and reducing market liquidity (Leland, 1992). Further, Fishman and Hagerty (1992) 
argue that insider trading harms the information environment as it deters outside market 
participants from collecting and trading on information because insider trading squeezes 
gains available to outsiders.  
It is generally expected that insiders are motivated by trading profits based on their 
informational advantage regarding the firm’s prospects. Models of informed trading such as 
Kyle (1985) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) assume that an insider is informed in every 
period, making it ideal to trade in every period. However, realistically, corporate insiders may 
not possess equal amounts of superior information all the time. In fact, they are presumed to 
have more informational advantage during certain times such as prior to earnings 
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announcements or takeover announcements (see Ke, Huddart and Petroni, 2003; Agrawal and 
Nasser, 2012). Insider trades are also relatively infrequent, due to the trading restrictions 
imposed on them by firm trading policies. Kyle’s (1985) theoretical model demonstrates that 
informed trading worsens the information environment as it leads to wider spreads due to the 
adverse selection problem between informed traders and other market participants. In Glosten 
and Milgrom’s (1985) model, when traders with superior information are present, there is a 
widening of the bid-ask spread. Similarly, Copeland and Galai (1983) show that the bid-ask 
spread is positively related to price level and return variance and negatively with market 
activity and depth.  
Empirically, the effect of insider trading on the information environment has been 
examined using various proxies for the information environment, with mixed results. Using 
the bid-ask spread, Chung and Charoenwong (1998) find that in firms with a greater 
proportion of insider trading, market makers protect themselves with wider spreads. Although 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) report that enforcement of insider trading laws improves stock 
price informativeness, the effect is concentrated in developed markets. Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004) find an inverse relationship because these trades contain firm specific 
information. Khan et al (2011) find no change in spread with insider sales for NASDAQ-100 
stocks. However, there are liquidity increases with active informed trading (Cornell and Sirri, 
1992) while there is an increase in effective spread during permitted insider trading periods 
(Bettis et al. 2000). Cao et al. (2004) report small and transitory increases in the effective 
spread with insider trading activities, although Cheng, Firth, Leung and Rui (2006) show 
wider spreads and lower depths on insider trading days compared to other days.  
Clarke and Shastri (2000) report no relationship between insider trades and PIN while 
Aktas, de Bodt and van Oppens (2008) show changes in relative order imbalance as a result 
of insider trading, indicative of faster price discovery on these days. Huddart and Ke (2007) 
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use six information asymmetry proxies including institutional ownership, analysts following, 
book-to-market ratio, frequency of firm reporting losses, firm reporting R&D expenditure 
and abnormal returns over previous earnings announcements. Overall, they find that the first 
four proxies do not reflect information asymmetry while R&D expenditure and abnormal 
returns do so for models of informed trading.  
 
2.2 Hypotheses development  
Considering the contradictory findings of the effects of insider trades on the 
information environment using various proxies, we re-examine the effect on insider trading 
activity on two interconnected contemporary measures of the information environment: 
adverse selection cost and the probability of informed trading (PIN) in the Australian market, 
a developed market with restrictive insider trading laws and effective enforcement. We relate 
the returns from insider trades, instead of the trades themselves to cost of adverse selection 
and the probability of informed trading because the information content of the trades is 
reflected in the post-trade returns. If insiders trade for private information, they should earn 
superior returns, i.e. the stock’s abnormal return is positive (negative) after informed insider 
purchase (sale).  
The adverse selection cost is an indirect measure of the cost of information 
asymmetry that together with order processing costs, inventory costs and competition make 
up the bid-ask spread. We directly use the cost of adverse selection instead of the bid-ask 
spread to eliminate the cross-sectional variation in the other components. Theoretically (see 
Kyle, 1985; Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985), a positive relationship 
is predicted between informed trading and information asymmetry. In the context of 
regulatory changes, Frijns, Gilbert and Tourani-Rad (2008) report a decrease in information 
asymmetry (spread) as a consequence of a change to the insider trading regulation in New 
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Zealand. However, Budsaratragoon, Hillier and Lhaophadchan (2012) caution that when 
insider trading regulations from developed economies are adopted in emerging ones such as 
Thailand, these regulations are ineffective as insiders continue to earn excess returns by 
exploiting their privileged information. 
Directors as a group of informed traders, trade on their private information, and this 
may increase information asymmetry between corporate managers and outside investors. 
Therefore, the insider trading activity will increase the adverse selection cost and worsen the 
information environment. In contrast, informed directors may deter informed trading by other 
non-insiders and level the playing field between informed and uninformed traders (Fishman 
and Hagerty, 1992). As a result, adverse selection cost can be reduced due to director trading. 
These competing hypotheses are stated as: 
H1: Director trading activity increases information asymmetry. 
H1a: Director trading activity decreases information asymmetry. 
 
Another dimension of the information environment is information efficiency. 
Information asymmetry and information efficiency are not identical concepts because the 
latter depends on the precision of private information held by corporate directors. Information 
efficiency increases the price informativeness and is useful for corporate decisions. For 
example, Ferreira et al. (2011) find the informed stock price increase the board efficiency and 
reduces the need for board independence. Kang and Liu (2010) find the risk-driven 
information-based trading leads to improved CEO incentives.  
One would only observe a significant impact of director trading on information 
efficiency if directors are exposed to precise private information and such information is not 
yet disclosed to other market participants. Therefore, the informed director trading can be 
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conducive to the information efficiency of stock trading environment (Fishman and Hagerty, 
1992). These two hypotheses are stated as: 
H2: Director trading activity increases information efficiency. 
H2a: Director trading activity decreases information efficiency. 
 
Next we investigate the insider motivation hypothesis. Insiders have different 
incentives for buying and selling shares, so we examine the effects of director purchases and 
director sales on the cost of adverse selection and PIN separately. The motivation for insider 
purchases is typically private information while for sales, the motivation could also be non-
informationally-based such as liquidity and diversification. In other words, insider purchases 
are expected to provide a clearer signal of its informational content than insider sales. Some 
research on insider motivations for trading supports these contentions. For example, 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005) both find that sales are not informative about 
future firm performance, and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) specifically report that only insider 
purchases in small firms predict firm future returns. Similarly, Seyhun (1992) shows that 
sales, especially in large firms, have lower information content. In addition, Fidrmuc, 
Goergen and Renneboog (2006) argue that the market’s reaction to insider purchases and 
sales is a function of ownership levels held by the insiders and other block holders due to the 
effect of the latter’s monitoring on information asymmetry. 
 In Australia, however there is the persistent and puzzling finding that insider sales 
have more information content than purchases (Brown et al, 2003, Chang, Hillman and 
Watson, 2005). Therefore abreakdown into purchases and sales is crucial when examining the 
Australian market. Hodgson and van Praag (2006) suggest a reason for this finding is the 
proportional difference in insider trading for non-information reasons between U.S. and 
Australian insiders as a result of their equity related compensation. In addition, insider trades 
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in Australian studies are made up of trades by corporate directors only, while with the U.S. 
definition of insider, the reported trades include trades by shareholders with holdings of five 
percent or more. These shareholders in Australia (known as substantial shareholders) report 
their trades under a different regulation.  
In light of the reported disparity in information content between director purchases 
and sales in Australian firms as in Brown et al (2003), we predict that the trading direction 
matters in the relationship between director trading and information environment. Therefore 
the hypotheses are stated as below:  
H3: Director purchases have stronger effects on the information environment than 
director sales. 
H3a: Director sales have stronger effects on the information environment than 
director purchases. 
 
Recent studies recognise that insiders are not a homogenous group. They play various 
roles within the firm and therefore have access to different types of firm specific information 
(Knewtson and Nofsinger, 2014). In addition, depending on their roles, insiders are subject to 
different levels of scrutiny and have different incentives to trade on private information. 
While executive directors are responsible for the running and management of the firm, non-
executive directors are expected to be independent of the firm and to monitor the activities 
and decisions of executive directors. An examination of the returns to insider trades reflects 
the interaction between the information on which trades are based (information hierarchy 
hypothesis) and the scrutiny hypothesis (willingness to capitalise on the information, given 
the scrutiny and visibility of the insider).  
Top-level insiders have access to more value-relevant information, as indicated by 
their trading activities (Lin and Howe, 1990; Nunn, Madden and Gombola, 1983; Seyhun, 
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1986). However, Fidrmuc et al (2006) did not find a relationship between insider position and 
subsequent returns, possibly due to the more intense scrutiny on senior management. 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2007) and Korczak, Korczak and Lasfer (2010) both consider the 
incentives to take advantage of private information and the impediments created by legal and 
reputational risks.3 In a study of late reported insider trades, Chang and Watson (2015) show 
that purchases by all insiders in small firms signalled future positive returns while only sales 
by executives in large firms predicted future negative returns. Ravina and Sapienza (2010) 
compare the trading returns of independent directors and executive directors. They find only 
small differences in their purchases, indicating that they maybe trading on similar 
information. Similarly, Gray, Harymawan and Nowland (2014) report that political and 
government connections on corporate boards have no particular effect on shareholder wealth 
in Australian firms. 
 
Therefore, there are inconsistent findings on the information possessed by different 
types of directors in the firm together with the effect of such information on their trading 
patterns. It is possible that executives have more material private information than non-
executive directors, but executives are under stricter scrutiny than non-executive directors. If 
non-executive directors trade relatively freely, the information content of non-executive 
director trading can be richer than that of executive director trading. On the other hand, non-
executive directors are responsible for monitoring the activities of the board and may be less 
likely to trade opportunistically.  
H4: Non-executive director trades have stronger effects on information environment 
than executive director trades. . 
                                                          
3 Piotroski and Roulstone (2007) analyse the non-linear relationship between insider trading and next year's 
earnings surprise. They report an increase in the likelihood of trading with the earnings surprise. However, this 
relationship does not hold in the case of extreme news. 
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H4a: Executive director trades have stronger effects on information environment than 
non-executive director trades. 
 
3. Data and Variable Construction 
In this section, we describe the data sources and variable construction employed to 
test our predictions. Our sample period starts from the fiscal year ending on or after July 2002 
through to June 2010. We winsorise variables at the top and bottom one percent of the 
distribution, to eliminate the effect of outliers.  
 
3.1  Measuring the information content of director trades  
We compile our sample by collecting director trade information from Appendix 3Y 
Change in Director Interest announcements on Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium. The 
sample is limited to ASX300 firms on the basis of market capitalisation at the beginning of 
each year. This includes the largest and more liquid firms with considerable trading by 
directors. To ensure no bias in the chosen sample, we conducted a pilot study and collected 
director trade information for the Top 500 firms by market capitalisation (based on the All 
Ordinaries Index) in the 2010 fiscal year. The director trades in ASX300 firms account for 
approximately 70% of the sample, assuring us that substantial director trading activity occurs 
in these firms. 
From Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium, director trade information including 
director name, director position, trade and report dates, number of shares traded, transaction 
price and the direction of trade (purchase or sale) are obtained. We exclude any trades due to 
reasons such as participation in dividend reinvestment plans, bonus issues, rights issues, 
employee share purchase schemes, option conversions, convertible note conversions and 
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exercise of performance rights. This filtering results in an initial sample of 21,973 trades over 
the nine-year period. 
On the basis of the director trade information, we use the (implied) profitability of 
director trades as the proxy for the information revealed through director trades. In other 
words, we expect profitable director transactions if corporate directors utilise their private 
informational advantage in their trades. Following prior literature (Ahmad et al. 2004; 
Friederich et al., 2002), the director trade profitability (CAR) is computed as the cumulative 
market-adjusted over the event window [0, 120], where day 0 represents the director 
transaction date. For ease of interpretation, we multiply CAR by -1 for director sales. We use 
the profit from these trades, instead of the trades themselves, because their information 
content is reflected in the post-trade returns. If insiders trade based on private information, 
they should earn superior profits, i.e. CAR is positive (negative) after informed insider 
purchase (sale), and a higher CAR indicates the insider has more informational advantage.  
In Table 1, we note that the mean value of CAR is 0.0242 and the median value is 
0.0178. The unreported results show that the mean is significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that director transactions are profitable on average, reassuring us that director 
trade profitability is a good proxy for the information content of director trades.  
 
<Please insert Table 1 here> 
 
3.2 Measuring Firm Information Environment 
Measures of a firm’s information environment in previous studies have been market-
oriented or related to firm characteristics. We chose market-oriented measures because they 
are less subject to managerial discretion and therefore are more exogenous than measures 
based on firm characteristics. For example, managers may time or distort disclosures 
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depending on their trading intentions (Rogers, 2008). Firm characteristics such as firm size 
and book-to-market ratio are simultaneously affected by determinants other than information 
asymmetry. Analyst coverage and institutional ownership estimate the external information 
search, but the data maybe too static to observe the immediate impact of insider trading.   
Market-oriented measures, on the other hand, directly gauge the informational impact 
of insider trades and are less subject to alternative explanations. Recent studies deploy similar 
proxies to examine the quality of a firm’s information environment. For example, Haggard, 
Howe and Lynch (2015) use spreads and other illiquidity ratios as proxies for information 
asymmetry and interpret a decrease in the illiquidity measures following non-recurring 
changes in earnings as an improvement in informational transparency. Chen, Goldstein and 
Jiang (2007) use PIN to assess the effect of price informativeness on firm investment policy. 
Some studies use daily measures, such as Amihud’s (2002) ratio and C2 in Llorente et al. 
(2002), but these measures are calculated from daily returns and the aggregated daily trading 
volume and thus may overlook some information incorporated in high-frequency data. Given 
our access to intraday data, we are able to calculate an adverse selection measure and PIN 
that utilize all relevant transactions and quotations, which should accurately reflect the 
information revealing process though trades. Nonetheless, the PIN developed by Easley et al 
(1996) and Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) is based on assumptions that independent 
information events occur daily and informed traders act on these events on the day they occur. 
In reality, these assumptions may not hold. In addition, PIN may also be correlated with other 
variables. For example, in a high information asymmetry stock, the adverse selection effect 
could show up as low trading volume and wide spreads. If PIN is correlated with some other 
factor, which in turn correlated with information asymmetry, then PIN will be correlated with 
the probability of informed trading; although information asymmetry is not identical to 
informed trading (Benos and Jochec, 2007). Mohanram and Rajgopal (2006) confirm that 
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PIN is not a risk factor that is priced in a cross-section of returns. Duarte and Young (2009) 
consider the issue of whether PIN is priced because it is associated with information 
asymmetry or other liquidity factors. They show that the PIN component related to 
information asymmetry is not priced, unlike its other component associated with liquidity, 
which is. Taking another perspective, Bollen, Smith and Whalley (2004) develop a simple 
and parsimonious bid-ask spread model that takes into account the minimum price tick, order 
processing costs, inventory holding costs, adverse selection costs and competition. An 
innovation of this model was that the probability of informed trading could be identified, 
thereby bypassing some of the issues with information asymmetry in the previously 
mentioned models.  
Various proxies have been used to study the relationship between insider trades and 
information environment and the results are understandably mixed. For example, Chung and 
Charoenwong (1998) find no change in spread or depth on insider trading days. Cornell and 
Sirri (1992) find liquidity increases with active informed trading, while Bettis et al. (2000) 
find an increase in effective spread during permitted insider trading periods. Cao et al. (2004) 
report small and temporary increases in the effective spread for insider trading activities, 
although Cheng, Firth, Leung and Rui (2006) show wider spreads and lower depths on insider 
trading days than on other days. Clarke and Shastri (200) report no relationship between 
insider trades and PIN. Huddart and Ke (2007) use six information asymmetry proxies 
(institutional ownership, analyst following, market to book ratio, loss frequency, R&D 
expenditure and abnormal return over past earnings announcements) when they investigated 
the relationship between insider trades and the firm’s information environment. They 
concluded that either the first four are not good proxies for information asymmetry or else, 
the models of informed trading cannot be applied to corporate insider trading. The variability 
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in these results recommends both careful selection of the appropriate proxy for information 
asymmetry and the sensitivity of the insider trades measure. 
Drawing on prior literature and to demonstrate the trade-offs expected with director 
trading, we measure two dimensions of the firm’s information environment using market-
based measures estimated from stock intraday transactions data. The advantage of using 
market-based measures is that these measures directly reflect the outcome of information 
asymmetry and information efficiency improvements resulting from director transactions. 
The market-based measures reflect the cost and benefit for investors as a result of the director 
trades. The proxy for firm information asymmetry is adverse selection cost while the proxy 
for corporate information efficiency is the probability of informed trading (PIN) measure. We 
estimate these two information proxies using stock intraday transactions data drawn from 
Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database.  
The classic market microstructure literature suggests that adverse selection cost and 
inventory cost are two major determinants of stock transaction costs. In this analysis, the 
computation of adverse selection cost for each trade follows the construct used in Goyenko, Holden, 
and Trzcinka (2009). For each trade i, we compute the corresponding adverse selection cost 
measure as follows:  
55 Minute Adverse Selection Cost 2 (ln( ) ln( ))i i i iD M M         (1)  
where 5iM   denotes the midpoint of prevailing quote prices five minutes after trade i  and iM  is 
the midpoint of prevailing quote prices for trade i; iD  denotes the trade direction which takes the 
value of one if trade i  is a buy transaction and takes the value of negative one if it is a sell 
transaction. Given that the TRTH database does not provide trade directions, we use Lee and Ready 
(1991) algorithm to assign trade directions. The daily adverse selection cost measure is equal to the 
value-weighted average of intraday adverse selection costs across all trades.  
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The measure of information asymmetry used in subsequent empirical analysis is 
computed as the average of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] where 
day 0 is the date of director transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs 
computed over the window [-120, -21] (denoted as adjAdverse). As shown in Table 1, the 
unscaled daily average adverse selection cost (Adverse) ranges from 0.0003 to 0.0106, with a 
mean value of 0.0024 and median of 0.0018. These statistics obtained from Australian stocks 
are largely comparable to those shown in the U.S studies. To reflect the rise in information 
asymmetry in the event window, we apply scaling to the Adverse variable.  
On the assumption that firm information efficiency is reflected by how quickly 
superior information is impounded into stock prices, we use the PIN measure developed by 
Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) as the proxy for information efficiency. This 
measure is based on a structural market microstructure model which consists of three 
participants, noise traders, informed traders and a market maker. Informed traders will trade 
on their private information when they believe the information is not publicly known. Thus, 
PIN directly captures the private information incorporated into stock price and measures the 
informativeness (Ferreira et al., 2011; Kang and Liu, 2010; Chen et al., 2007). The PIN 
measure in the event window [0, 120] relative to director transaction date is estimated in two 
steps: we first identify the trades on each trading day as a buy or sell transaction; in the next 
step, we use the algorithm in Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) to estimate PIN 
over 120 days from the day of the transaction. Again, the raw PIN measure is scaled by its 
estimate obtained from the [-120, -21] window in order to control for the level of information 
efficiency.  
Table 1 summarises the distribution of variables. In our sample, adjAdverse ranges 
from 0.4223 to 2.3959, with a mean of 1.0237. The mean and median values of PIN are 
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0.1818 and 0.1715, respectively, similar to the PIN statistics documented for the NYSE 
stocks.  
 
3.3 Other variables 
We also control for a number of firm-level variables in our study. These control 
variables are turnover (Turnover), return volatility (Volatility), book-to-market ratio (BM), 
firm size (Size), and resource and financial industry dummy variables. The information on 
control variables is collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream database and is matched 
with trade data from DatAnalysis Premium. 
Specifically, turnover is defined as log of number of shares traded over the 
previous year. Return volatility is the log of the standard deviation of daily returns over the 
previous year. To control for other unobservable firmcharacteristics, we also include book-to-
market ratio and a firm size variable. The book-to-market ratio is defined as the book value of 
equity divided by the market value of equity. Size is equal to the log of market value of equity 
at the end of the previous year. The urnover variable, Turnover, exhibits a symmetric 
distribution, evident from a mean of 5.545 and a median of 5.696. The mean values of 
Volatility and BM are 0.0212 and 0.5743, respectively. The mean and median of Size are 
21.393 and 21.267, suggesting that our sample firms are relatively large.   
           Finally, we control for two industry indicator variables. With the high proportion of 
resource firms in the Australian market together with more pronounced information 
asymmetry issues in this sector, a resource sector indicator variable is included. Resource 
takes on a value of one when the firm is in the resources sector and zero otherwise. As many 
of the largest firms in the Australian market are financial institutions which are subject to 
additional regulatory scrutiny, we include Financials (which takes the value of one if a firm 
operates in the financial sector, and zero otherwise), an indicator variable to account for this 
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effect. As shown in Table 1, it is not surprising that approximately 17% of the companies are 
in the resources sector while about 25.6% of the sample firms are in the financial sector. 
These statistics confirm the necessity to control for these two industries in our empirical 
analyses.  
 
3.4 Pearson correlation of variables 
             There are several noteworthy observations in Table 2 which reports the Pearson 
correlation coefficients among all of the variables in this study. First, the measure of the 
information content of insider trading, CAR, is negatively and significantly related to post-
event adjusted adverse selection cost (adjAdverse) but positively and significantly related to 
post-event adjusted PIN (adjPIN). This implies that informative director trading reduces 
information asymmetry between corporate directors and outside investors and promotes the 
information efficiency through the trading process. Second, while the correlation coefficient 
between adjAdverse and adjPIN is 0.011, this coefficient is statistically insignificant. The 
implication from this observation is that although both measures capture information-based 
stock trading activities, they reflect different dimensions of the firm’s information 
environment. Finally, except for the strong correlation between Turnover and Size (the 
correlation coefficient is 0.711), all other correlation coefficients among variables are only 
moderate, alleviating the multicollinearity concern in our empirical analysis.   
 
<Please insert Table 2 here> 
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Main analysis 
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           There has been much debate in the literature on the benefits and costs of insider trading 
on the information environment. Opponents of insider trading argue that when directors trade 
on their privileged private information, such trading increases the information asymmetry 
between corporate insiders and outside investors and worsens the information environment of 
stock trading. However, others argue that director trading can facilitate the incorporation of 
private information into stock price through their informed trading activities, leading to more 
efficient stock prices. In this empirical investigation, we systematically look at the effects of 
informed insider trading on both the information asymmetry and information efficiency of the 
stock trading environment.  
          The main analysis is carried out by estimating the following Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression model specification:  
1 2 3 4 5
6 7
InfoEnv
                 Re +  Year dummies,
CAR Turnover Volatility BM Size
source Financials
     
 
      

     (2) 
where InfoEnv alternatively represents adjusted adverse selection cost(adjAdverse) or 
adjusted PIN (adjPIN) over the event window [0, 120] relative to the director transaction date. 
CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 120] relative 
to the director transaction date. The list of control variables includes stock turnover 
(Turnover), stock return volatility (Volatility), book-to-market ratio (BM), firm size (Size), the 
resource sector dummy variable (Resource) and the financial sector dummy variable 
(Financials). Year dummies are also included to control for the time variations in the 
information environment measures over the years.  
          We first examine the effect of informed director trading on the cost of adverse selection, 
adjAdverse, by estimating the baseline regression and reporting the results in model (2) of 
Table 3. We observe a consistently strong negative association between returns from trades 
and post-director trade adverse selection cost. The coefficient on CAR is -0.178  
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(t-value = -4.71). In model (1), the coefficient on CAR is -0.168 (t-value = -4.24) and in 
model (3), the coefficient on CAR becomes -0.133 (t-value = -4.41) after controlling for other 
stock and firm characteristics including year dummies. The overall results indicate that 
informative director trading (measured by director trading profitability) reduces the 
information asymmetry between informed traders and uninformed traders and supports 
hypothesis H1a. The interpretation is plausible if informed directors deter the informed 
trading from other non-directors and therefore level the playing field between informed and 
uninformed traders (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992).  
        The selected control variables appear to capture the expected signs. Taking the full 
sample results in model (3) for example, we find a positive relationship between post-director 
trading adverse selection cost and stock turnover, indicating that informed traders tend to be 
able to hide their traders better in actively traded stocks. In addition, the positive coefficient 
on Volatility suggests that stocks with high information uncertainty experience an increase in 
adverse selection cost following director trading. Finally, we note that post-director trading 
adverse selection cost increases with book-to-market ratio and declines if firms operate in the 
resources sector.   
<Please insert Table 3 here> 
 
           Next, we turn to the effect of director trading on the information efficiency of stock 
trading. It is argued that information asymmetry and information efficiency are not identical 
concepts because the latter depends on the precision of private information held by corporate 
insiders. One would only observe significant impact of director trading on information 
efficiency if directors are exposed to precise private information and such information is not 
yet disclosed to other market participants. In Table 4, we document a strong positive 
relationship between director trading profitability and information efficiency. Without 
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controlling for any other variables, the coefficient of CAR is 1.890 (t-value = 2.02) in model 
(1). The magnitude and statistical significance remains similar after the incorporation of all 
controls including year dummy variables. These results are in line with the notion that 
informed director trading is conducive to the information efficiency of stock trading 
environment (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992), and supports hypothesis H2.  
 
< Please insert Table 4 here> 
 
 We further disaggregate insider trades into purchases and sales and report the results 
in Table 5. In models (1) and (2), the results show a negative relation between CAR and 
adjAdverse for director purchases but a positive relation between CAR and adjAdverse for 
director sales, suggesting that informed director purchases have distinct effects from director 
sales. On average, director purchases mitigate the information asymmetry faced by 
uninformed liquidity traders while director sales aggravate the problem.  
            Next, we examine whether the effect of director trading on information efficiency is 
related to the direction of director trades by partitioning our sample into purchases sales. The 
results in models (3) and (4) of Table 5 show a positive and significant coefficient on CAR on 
the director purchases subsample (which accounts for 87% of the full sample) with an 
insignificant coefficient in the director sales subsample (13% of the full sample). Consistent 
with the information asymmetry effect, it appears that only director purchases help to 
promote the informational efficiency of the stock trading environment by impounding private 
information into stock prices, supporting hypothesis H3a.   
 
< Please insert Table 5 here> 
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As stated in H4 and H4a, there could be an information hierarchy between executive 
and non-executive directors. Executives are under stricter scrutiny while non-executive 
directors can trade relatively freely. Therefore, the information content of non-executive 
director trading can be richer than that of executive director trading. After splitting all 
director trades into executive and non-executive trades in Table 6, it is clear that non-
executive trades are more prominent in our sample, which accounts for approximately 73% of 
the full sample, consistent with the low level of liability associated with non-executive trades.  
By regressing adjusted adverse selection cost on the director trading profitability 
measure, CAR on both executive trades and non-executive trades subsample, we find negative 
and highly significant coefficients on CAR across both subsamples in models (1) and (2), 
while the coefficients show a stronger effect in the non-executive trades subsample. However, 
the effects of executive trades versus non-executive traders are remarkably distinct on 
information efficiency, as shown in models (3) and (4). We note an insignificant coefficient 
on CAR on executive trades subsample while a positive and significant coefficient on CAR on 
non-executive trades subsample. These results collectively suggest that it is the information 
distilled from non-executive trades that has a stronger influence on the informational 
efficiency of the stock trading environment. Our findings support the argument that insiders 
should not be treated as a homogenous group of informed traders and the different levels of 
scrutiny surrounding executives and non-executive director trading causes them to trade 
differently on the information they have obtained.  
 
< Please insert Table 6 here> 
           
4.2 Robustness tests 
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We address several concerns about our empirical design in this section. Because of 
the overlap in the event window we use to compute director trading profitability and two 
information environment variables, it is possible that the observed relationship between the 
two sets of variables are simultaneously driven by the same but unobservable firm/stock 
characteristics. To mitigate this concern, we re-estimate the two information proxies using an 
alternative event window [121, 240] relative to director transaction date. The related results 
are reported in models (1) and (2) of Table 7. We find that the coefficient of CAR is -0.309 (t-
value = -7.56) when new adjusted adverse selection cost is used as dependent variable, while 
the coefficient of CAR is 1.873 (t-value = 1.80) when new adjusted PIN is the dependent 
variable. The results are qualitatively the same as the previous findings.  
In addition, it is argued that buy-and-hold returns are more efficient than cumulative 
abnormal returns if the event window tends to be long. To ensure the robustness of our results, 
we re-estimate the measure of director trading profitability as the buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns over the event window [0, 120] relative to director transaction date. In models (3) and 
(4), we find results consistent with those reported in Table 3 and Table 4.  
 
<Please insert Table 7 here> 
 
It should be noted that two significant market events occurred during our sample 
period from 2002 to 2010. The prominent events include the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Australia in 2005 and the adverse economic impact 
of the global financial crisis in 2008. In Table 8, we take a further step and examine whether 
these important market events have any influence on the relationship between director trading 
profitability and the stock trading environment. Specifically, to evaluate the effect of IFRS on 
director trading profitability, we introduce an additional dummy variable, IFRS, into the 
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baseline regression model (2). This dummy variable takes a value of one if the observation is 
on or after fiscal year 2005, and zero otherwise. In Table 8, including the dummy IFRS and 
the interaction term between IFRS and CAR, we observe a negative and significant coefficient 
on IFRS in model (1) when adjusted adverse selection cost is used as dependent variable, but 
an insignificant coefficient on IFRS in model (3) when adjusted PIN is used as dependent 
variable. These results are consistent with prior literature which finds evidence of the IFRS 
adoption improving financial transparency and thereby reducing information asymmetry with 
outside investors (Daske et al., 2008; Barth et al., 2008).  However, we find no significant 
effect of the interaction terms in either model (1) or model (3), indicating that there is no 
distinguishable effect of the IFRS adoption on the relationship between director trading 
profitability and the stock trading information environment. This indicates that the 
information available to insiders under IFRS does not affect their trading returns and is 
consistent with the superior information held by these insiders, regardless of the introduction 
of IFRS. This finding mirrors Straser (2002) where there was no change in cost of adverse 
selection or probability of informed trading with the introduction of Regulation FD. 
            We further examine the impact of global financial crisis on the association between 
informative director trading and stock trading information environment in models (2) and (4) 
of Table 8. Empirically, we incorporate a global financial crisis dummy variable (GFC) and 
its interaction with CAR into the baseline model. The GFC dummy variable takes a value of 
one if the observation is in year 2008, and zero otherwise. Interestingly, in model (2), we find 
a negative coefficient on GFC when adjusted adverse selection cost is used as dependent 
variable. It implies that the post-director trading information asymmetry declines in the year 
of global financial crisis. Our interpretation is that the widespread global financial crisis 
directs investor attention to market-wide information and therefore alleviates the impact of 
firm-specific information. More importantly, we find that the coefficients of the interaction 
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between GFC and CAR are statistically insignificant in models (2) and (4), suggesting that 
global financial crisis has no marginal effect on the relation between the information content 
of director trading and stock trading information environment. Overall, results in Table 8 
suggest that our finding on the impact of director trading is robust to different market 
conditions. 
<Please insert Table 8 here> 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
In this study we investigate an important and much debated issue about the empirical 
effect of director trades on firm information environment. Using adverse selection cost and 
probability of informed trading as proxies for two important but distinct dimensions of 
information environment, we document several interesting results. 
First, on a sample of the 300 largest Australian firms for the period 2002-2010, the 
information content of corporate insider trading, measured by director trading profitability, 
exhibits an inverse relation with post-director trading information asymmetry between 
corporate directors and outside investors, measured by adjusted adverse selection cost. This 
suggests that informative director trading decreases information asymmetry. We also 
document a positive relationship between director trading profitability and post-director 
trading information efficiency, measured by PIN. This finding is consistent with director 
trading facilitating the improvement of stock price informativeness and the information 
efficiency of stock trading environment. Further analysis reveals that the above results are 
mainly driven by director purchases instead of director sales.  
We also investigate the differential effects of executive and non-executive director 
trading on the stock trading information environment. Though our results suggest no distinct 
impact of executive and non-executive director trading on the information asymmetry aspect 
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of the stock trading environment, it appears that non-executive director trading promotes 
information efficiency. Finally, we examine the marginal impact of significant market events, 
the adoption of IFRS in 2005 and the global financial crisis in 2008, on the association 
between the information content of director trading and the stock trading environment but 
document no significant impact from these events.  
This study supports the viewpoint that trading by directors is crucial for reducing 
information asymmetry and improving information efficiency for stock market participants. 
Further, it is also important to understand how the types of director trades and the roles of the 
directors affect information asymmetry and information efficiency differently. Such trading 
activity has to be effectively regulated and monitored to ensure transparency and confidence 
in capital markets. The objectives of director trading regulation and disclosure requirements 
are for investor protection, that is, to ensure investors operate in an informed and orderly 
market. Up to date and complete information about changes in the shareholdings of directors 
is vital to investors and the market in general to comprehend the effect of these changes on 
firm value. If such information is not available or incomplete, i.e., when there is a lack of 
transparency, then investors may not be able to make savvy decisions on their trading. The 
2008 Australian Share Ownership Study conducted by the ASX showed that 41% of adult 
Australians owned shares and of these, 90% participated in the market directly via shares, 
other listed investments and self-managed superannuation funds. Given the proportion of 
these types of investors in the Australian market, complete disclosure of director trading has 
become increasingly critical. A comprehensive documentation of director trading activity is 
fundamental if we are to better understand the impact and effect of these activities on many 
aspects of firm value and trading participation. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics  
This table presents the summary statistics of all the variables employed in this study. The summary 
statistics include mean value (Mean), median value (Median), standard deviation (StdDev), 5th 
percentile (P5) and 95th percentile (P95), minimum value (Min) and maximum value (Max). Adverse 
is the average of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] where day 0 is the date of 
the insider transaction.  PIN is the probability of informed trading (PIN) measure by Easley, Kiefer, 
O’Hara and Paperman (1996) estimated in the event window [0, 120]. adjAdverse is the average of 
daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] where day 0 is the date of the insider 
transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs computed over the window [-120, -21] 
relative to the insider transaction date.  adjPIN is the PIN variable estimated in the window [0, 120] 
scaled by the PIN measure estimated in the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the insider 
trading transaction. CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 
120]. Turnover is the log of number of shares traded in the previous year. Volatility is the log of 
standard deviation of daily stock returns in the previous year. BM is the book-to-market ratio 
calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Size is equal to log of 
market value of equity. Resource is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm 
operates in resources industry, and zero otherwise. Financial is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of one if a firm operates in financial industry, and zero otherwise. All variables are winsorised 
at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. The number of insider trades with non-missing variables 
is 17,676. The sample period is from 2002 to 2010.  
 
 
Mean Median Std P5  P95 Min Max 
Adverse 0.0024 0.0018 0.0020 0.0005 0.0065 0.0003 0.0106 
PIN 0.1818 0.1715 0.0910 0.0228 0.3390 0.0005 0.4678 
adjAdverse 1.0237 0.9710 0.3390 0.5796 1.6722 0.4223 2.3959 
adjPIN 3.3624 0.9810 15.0426 0.2518 2.6058 0.0037 125.8103 
CAR 0.0242 0.0178 0.2076 -0.2968 0.3686 -0.6131 0.7440 
Turnover 5.5450 5.6963 1.4528 3.0908 7.6976 2.2459 8.5119 
Volatility 0.0212 0.0182 0.0102 0.0097 0.0427 0.0079 0.0576 
BM 0.5743 0.4925 0.3785 0.1409 1.3312 0.0721 2.0625 
Size 21.3932 21.2669 1.6449 18.9211 24.4431 18.1249 24.8658 
Resource 0.1714 0.0000 0.3769 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Financials 0.2559 0.0000 0.4364 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Table 2 Pearson Correlation Coefficients  
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients among all the variables employed in this study. adjAdverse 
is the average of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] where day 0 is the date of the insider 
transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs computed over the window [-120, -21] relative to the 
insider transaction date.  adjPIN  is the PIN variable estimated in the window [0, 120] scaled by the PIN measure 
estimated in the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the insider trading transaction. CAR is the cumulative 
market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 120]. Turnover is the log of number of shares traded in the 
previous year. Volatility is the log of standard deviation of daily stock returns in the previous year. BM is the book-
to-market ratio calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Size is equal to log of 
market value of equity. Resource is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm operates in resources 
industry, and zero otherwise. Financial is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if a firm operates in 
financial industry, and zero otherwise. All variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. 
The p-values are shown in the parentheses. The number of insider trades with non-missing variables is 17,676. The 
sample period is from 2002 to 2010.  
 
 
adjAdverse adjPin CAR Turnover Volatility BM Size Resource Financials 
adjAdverse 1.000 
        adjPIN 0.011 1.000 
       
 
(0.13) 
        CAR -0.103 0.026 1.000 
      
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
       Turnover 0.016 0.033 -0.028 1.000 
     
 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
      Volatility 0.210 0.011 0.066 -0.049 1.000 
    
 
(0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) 
     BM 0.092 -0.016 0.000 -0.037 0.228 1.000 
   
 
(0.00) (0.04) (0.95) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Size -0.032 0.026 -0.045 0.711 -0.361 -0.334 1.000 
  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   Resource -0.052 0.010 0.069 0.129 0.307 -0.087 -0.010 1.000 
 
 
(0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) 
  Financials -0.002 -0.009 -0.049 0.096 -0.223 0.042 0.321 -0.267 1.000 
 
(0.74) (0.22) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Table 3 Effects of Insider Trading Profitability on Information Asymmetry  
This table presents the regression results of the stock trading information proxy, adjAdverse, 
on the information content of insider trades measure, CAR, together with other control 
variables. adjAdverse is the average of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] 
where day 0 is the date of the insider transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs 
computed over the window [-120, -21] relative to the insider transaction date.  CAR is the cumulative 
market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 120]. Turnover is the log of number of shares 
traded in the previous year. Volatility is the log of standard deviation of daily stock returns in the 
previous year. BM is the book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value of equity divided by the 
market value of equity. Size is equal to log of market value of equity. Resource is a dummy variable 
which takes the value of one if the firm operates in resources industry, and zero otherwise. Financial 
is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if a firm operates in financial industry, and zero 
otherwise. All variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. The t-values 
based on the standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in the parentheses. NObs is 
the number of observations. Adj. R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The sample period is from 2002 to 
2010. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 1.028 0.421 0.868 
 
(142.03) (2.95) (5.40) 
CAR -0.168 -0.178 -0.133 
 
(-4.24) (-4.71) (-4.41) 
Turnover 
 
-0.006 0.015 
  
(-0.71) (2.13) 
Volatility 
 
9.140 5.094 
  
(8.85) (3.57) 
BM 
 
0.046 0.079 
  
(1.67) (3.15) 
Size 
 
0.021 0.005 
  
(2.70) (0.62) 
Resource 
 
-0.111 -0.080 
  
(-6.07) (-5.01) 
Financials  -0.009 -0.009 
  
(-0.50) (-0.66) 
Year FE No No Yes 
NObs 17,676 17,676 17,676 
Adj. R2 1.0% 7.6% 28.8% 
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Table 4 Effects of Insider Trading Profitability on Stock Price Informativeness  
This table presents the regression results of the stock trading information proxy, adjPIN, on 
the information content of insider trades measure, CAR, together with other control variables. 
adjPIN  is the PIN variable estimated in the window [0, 120] scaled by the PIN measure estimated in 
the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the insider trading transaction..  CAR is the cumulative 
market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 120]. Turnover is the log of number of shares 
traded in the previous year. Volatility is the log of standard deviation of daily stock returns in the 
previous year. BM is the book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value of equity divided by the 
market value of equity. Size is equal to log of market value of equity. Resource is a dummy variable 
which takes the value of one if the firm operates in resources industry, and zero otherwise. Financial 
is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if a firm operates in financial industry, and zero 
otherwise. All variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. The t-values 
based on the standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in the parentheses. NObs is 
the number of observations. Adj. R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The sample period is from 2002 to 
2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 3.316 -0.958 1.324 
 
(10.98) (-0.20) (0.25) 
CAR 1.890 1.882 1.893 
 
(2.02) (2.01) (2.13) 
Turnover 
 
0.269 0.339 
  
(0.83) (1.07) 
Volatility 
 
25.926 4.798 
  
(0.83) (0.11) 
BM 
 
-0.563 -0.686 
  
(-0.87) (-1.01) 
Size 
 
0.126 0.058 
  
(0.48) (0.21) 
Resource 
 
-0.209 -0.029 
  
(-0.26) (-0.04) 
Financials  -0.400 -0.399 
  
(-0.52) (-0.52) 
Year FE No No Yes 
NObs 17,525 17,525 17,525 
Adj. R2 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 
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Table 5 Effects of Insider Purchases and Sales on Stock Trading Information 
Environment  
This table presents the regression results of two stock trading information proxies, 
adjAdverse and adjPIN, on the information content of insider trades measure, CAR, together 
with other control variables. Year dummies are also included in all the estimation models. 
Models (1) and (3) report results based on the subsample of insider purchases while Models 
(2) and (4) estimate the regression models on the subsample of insider sell. adjAdverse is the 
average of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] where day 0 is the date of the 
insider transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs computed over the window [-120, -
21] relative to the insider transaction date.  adjPIN is the PIN variable estimated in the window [0, 
120] scaled by the PIN measure estimated in the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the insider 
trading transaction. CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 
120]. Turnover is the log of number of shares traded in the previous year. Volatility is the log of 
standard deviation of daily stock returns in the previous year. BM is the book-to-market ratio 
calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Size is equal to log of 
market value of equity. Resource is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm 
operates in resources industry, and zero otherwise. Financial is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of one if a firm operates in financial industry, and zero otherwise. All variables are winsorised 
at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. The t-values based on the standard errors adjusted for 
firm-level clustering are reported in the parentheses. NObs is the number of observations. Adj. R2 is 
the adjusted R-squared. The sample period is from 2002 to 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
adjAdverse 
 
adjPIN 
 
Purchase Sell 
 
Purchase Sell 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.800 1.245 
 
4.127 -19.862 
 
(4.68) (6.43) 
 
(0.70) (-2.34) 
CAR -0.191 0.235 
 
1.865 0.659 
 
(-5.46) (4.28) 
 
(1.88) (0.45) 
Turnover 0.014 0.025 
 
0.424 -0.256 
 
(1.78) (2.62) 
 
(1.21) (-0.64) 
Volatility 6.358 0.287 
 
-15.019 191.956 
 
(4.22) (0.16) 
 
(-0.34) (1.95) 
BM 0.071 0.074 
 
-0.795 0.822 
 
(2.67) (2.07) 
 
(-1.04) (0.68) 
Size 0.007 -0.009 
 
-0.070 0.965 
 
(0.89) (-1.01) 
 
(-0.23) (2.54) 
Resource -0.082 -0.069 
 
0.121 -2.049 
 
(-4.68) (-3.06) 
 
(0.13) (-1.99) 
Financials -0.010 -0.013 
 
-0.299 -0.819 
 
(-0.69) (-0.61) 
 
(-0.36) (-0.89) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NObs 15,396 2,899 
 
15,263 2,874 
Adj. R2 29.7% 27.5% 
 
0.5% 1.2% 
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Table 6 Effects of Executives’ and Non-executives’ Trading Profitability on Stock 
Trading Information Environment  
This table presents the regression results of two stock trading information proxies, 
adjAdverse and adjPIN, on the information content of insider trades measure, CAR, together 
with other control variables. Year dummies are also included in all the estimation models. 
Models (1) and (3) report results based on the subsample of insider trades executed by 
corporate executives while Models (2) and (4) estimate the regression models on the 
subsample of insider purchases executed by non-executive directors. adjAdverse is the average 
of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] where day 0 is the date of the insider 
transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs computed over the window [-120, -21] 
relative to the insider transaction date.  adjPIN is the PIN variable estimated in the window [0, 120] 
scaled by the PIN measure estimated in the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the insider 
trading transaction. CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 
120]. Turnover is the log of number of shares traded in the previous year. Volatility is the log of 
standard deviation of daily stock returns in the previous year. BM is the book-to-market ratio 
calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Size is equal to log of 
market value of equity. Resource is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm 
operates in resources industry, and zero otherwise. Financial is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of one if a firm operates in financial industry, and zero otherwise. All variables are winsorised 
at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. The t-values based on the standard errors adjusted for 
firm-level clustering are reported in the parentheses. NObs is the number of observations. Adj. R2 is 
the adjusted R-squared. The sample period is from 2002 to 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
adjAdverse 
 
adjPIN 
 
Executives 
Non-
Executives 
 
Executives 
Non-
executives 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.679 0.891 
 
-8.356 6.481 
 
(2.53) (4.85) 
 
(-1.29) (0.94) 
CAR -0.091 -0.157 
 
1.947 1.860 
 
(-2.24) (-4.42) 
 
(1.54) (1.86) 
Turnover 0.017 0.015 
 
0.193 0.456 
 
(1.40) (1.89) 
 
(0.46) (1.17) 
Volatility 6.885 4.956 
 
49.754 -13.513 
 
(2.76) (3.18) 
 
(0.95) (-0.24) 
BM 0.067 0.083 
 
0.596 -1.360 
 
(1.84) (2.90) 
 
(0.91) (-1.60) 
Size 0.013 0.003 
 
0.416 -0.150 
 
(1.06) (0.40) 
 
(1.18) (-0.42) 
Resource -0.097 -0.077 
 
0.912 -0.343 
 
(-3.78) (-4.46) 
 
(0.79) (-0.33) 
Financials -0.013 -0.006 
 
-0.112 -0.394 
 
(-0.60) (-0.41) 
 
(-0.12) (-0.43) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NObs 4,407 11,882 
 
4,375 11,779 
Adj. R2 30.0% 28.6% 
 
0.4% 0.7% 
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Table 7 Robustness Tests  
This table presents two sets of robustness tests on the main results. In Models (1) and (2), we use adjAdverse240 
and adjPIN240 as the dependent variables, where adjAdverse240 is the daily average adverse selection cost 
computed in the window [121, 240], scaled by the daily average adverse selection cost computed in the 
estimation window [-120, -21]; and adjPIN240 is the PIN variable estimated in the window [121, 240] scaled by 
the PIN measure estimated in the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the insider trading transaction. In 
Models (3) and (4), we use an alternative measure of insider trading profitability, BHAR, which is computed as 
the buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns in the window [0, 120]. Year dummies are also included in all 
the estimation models. adjAdverse is the average of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] 
where day 0 is the date of the insider transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs computed over 
the window [-120, -21] relative to the insider transaction date.  adjPIN is the PIN variable estimated in the 
window [0, 120] scaled by the PIN measure estimated in the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the 
insider trading transaction. CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 120]. 
IFRS is a dummy variable which equals one if the observation is on or after fiscal year 2005, and zero otherwise. 
GFC is a dummy variable which equals one if the observation is on or after year 2008, and zero otherwise. 
Turnover is the log of number of shares traded in the previous year. Volatility is the log of standard deviation of 
daily stock returns in the previous year. BM is the book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value of equity 
divided by the market value of equity. Size is equal to log of market value of equity. Resource is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of one if the firm operates in resources industry, and zero otherwise. Financial is 
a dummy variable which takes the value of one if a firm operates in financial industry, and zero otherwise. All 
variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. The t-values based on the standard errors 
adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in the parentheses. NObs is the number of observations. Adj. R2 is 
the adjusted R-squared. The sample period is from 2002 to 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AdjAdverse240 AdjPIN240 AdjAdverse AdjPIN 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 1.295 1.503 0.871 1.284 
 
(5.78) (0.24) (5.44) (0.24) 
CAR -0.309 1.873 
  
 
(-7.56) (1.80) 
  BHAR 
  
-0.138 1.830 
   
(-5.11) (2.04) 
Turnover 0.033 0.460 0.015 0.341 
 
(3.00) (1.13) (2.11) (1.08) 
Volatility 3.738 -11.834 5.088 5.020 
 
(1.79) (-0.25) (3.57) (0.11) 
BM 0.094 -0.394 0.078 -0.672 
 
(3.05) (-0.48) (3.11) (-0.99) 
Size -0.017 0.053 0.005 0.059 
 
(-1.59) (0.16) (0.61) (0.22) 
Resource -0.113 -0.033 -0.079 -0.037 
 
(-4.83) (-0.03) (-4.97) (-0.05) 
Financials 0.004 -0.507 -0.009 -0.396 
 
(0.19) (-0.56) (-0.69) (-0.52) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
NObs 16,933 16,764 17,676 17,525 
Adj R2 36.5% 1.8% 0.365 0.008 
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Table 8 Effects of IFRS adoption and Global Financial Crisis on the Relationship 
between Insider Trading Profitability and Stock Trading Information Environment 
This table presents the regression results of two stock trading information proxies, adjAdverse and adjPIN, on 
the information content of insider trades measure, CAR, and its interactions with the IFRS adoption and GFC 
dummy variables, together with other control variables. Year dummies are also included in all the estimation 
models. adjAdverse is the average of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] where day 0 is 
the date of the insider transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs computed over the window [-
120, -21] relative to the insider transaction date.  adjPIN is the PIN variable estimated in the window [0, 120] 
scaled by the PIN measure estimated in the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the insider trading 
transaction. CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 120]. IFRS is a 
dummy variable which equals one if the observation is on or after fiscal year 2005, and zero otherwise. GFC is a 
dummy variable which equals one if the observation is on or after year 2008, and zero otherwise. Turnover is 
the log of number of shares traded in the previous year. Volatility is the log of standard deviation of daily stock 
returns in the previous year. BM is the book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value of equity divided by 
the market value of equity. Size is equal to log of market value of equity. Resource is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of one if the firm operates in resources industry, and zero otherwise. Financial is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of one if a firm operates in financial industry, and zero otherwise. All variables 
are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. The t-values based on the standard errors adjusted 
for firm-level clustering are reported in the parentheses. NObs is the number of observations. Adj. R2 is the 
adjusted R-squared. The sample period is from 2002 to 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
adjAdverse 
 
adjPIN 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.354 0.174 
 
-0.924 -0.410 
 
(2.54) (1.18) 
 
(-0.19) (-0.09) 
CAR -0.178 -0.160 
 
3.868 3.268 
 
(-2.94) (-3.64) 
 
(1.57) (2.45) 
IFRS -0.083 
  
0.262 
 
 
(-5.68) 
  
(0.49) 
 IFRS*CAR -0.008 
  
-2.492 
 
 
(-0.11) 
  
(-0.91) 
 GFC 
 
-0.096 
  
0.264 
  
(-4.40) 
  
(0.34) 
GFC*CAR -0.039 
  
-3.139 
  
(-0.60) 
  
(-1.62) 
Turnover -0.004 -0.009 
 
0.263 0.282 
 
(-0.45) (-1.03) 
 
(0.81) (0.88) 
Volatility 10.586 11.947 
 
23.251 22.100 
 
(10.09) (9.27) 
 
(0.75) (0.69) 
BM 0.040 0.071 
 
-0.562 -0.655 
 
(1.44) (2.75) 
 
(-0.87) (-0.96) 
Size 0.025 0.031 
 
0.120 0.100 
 
(3.32) (3.94) 
 
(0.46) (0.38) 
Resource -0.114 -0.120 
 
-0.211 -0.229 
 
(-6.28) (-6.27) 
 
(-0.26) (-0.28) 
Financials -0.013 -0.014 
 
-0.398 -0.373 
 
(-0.76) (-0.78) 
 
(-0.52) (-0.48) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nobs 17,676 17,676 
 
17,525 17,525 
Adj. R2 8.8% 8.5% 
 
0.2% 0.2% 
